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PLANNED PUBLIC WORKS AS AN
AGENCY OF ECONOMIC STABILIZATION:
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE IDEA
FLEXIBLE PUBLIC WORKS AS A STABILIZING INFLUENCE
PROPOSALS for utilizing public works as an agency of eco-
nomic stabilization in an unstable economic system have
been receiving much attention in recent years. In essence the
suggestion is that public works should be planned and bud-
geted sufficiently in advance to be conducted on a flexible
schedule, operations being timed to fluctuate inversely with
general cyclical movements of business, that is, retarded in
periods of prosperity and speeded in periods of industrial
stagnation. Public works have usually been undertaken in
large volume in good times both because of greater popular
demand and because governments have the money or are
more willing to borrow. Conversely, depressions have usu-
ally found public authorities with a heavy load of debt and
impaired borrowing powers. Thus the expansion of public
construction in prosperity has increased the pressure on the
market for materials and the labor supply, and consequently
encouraged 'inflationary' tendencies; while its contraction
in periods of depression has meant that a curtailment of
public expenditures accentuated the effects of the reduction
of private spending. It has been argued that an elastic sys-
tem of controlled public works would correct both these
evils by giving when needed a general stimulus or check to
economic activity as a whole.
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The success of a policy of controlled public works will
be conditioned largely by the relative volume that can be
readily advanced or postponed. This in turn depends very
considerably, despite almost infinitely diverse local condi-
tions, upon the thoroughness with which advance plans,
both engineering and financial, are prepared. The long-
range planning and budgeting of public works is an essen-
tial prerequisite if a great variety of administrative, technical
and financial difficulties which consume time when time is
precious are to be avoided.
This study is in the main an attempt to supply, by means
of an historical, descriptive and analytic survey, the basic
factual material necessary to evaluate the possibility of
utilizing planned public works as an agency of economic
stabilization. To undertake such a task is far from implying
that the chief function of public works is to serve as a 'bal-
ance wheel' for business. Quite conceivably, criteria based
on other, longer-term, considerations, and viewing the com-
munity's social-economic interests from differentangles,
might suggest principles of public works planning that
would conflict in certain respects with this objective. The
problem would then arise of reconciling these divergent
desiderata or making compromises. Other studies now be-
ing made are concerned with these questions: they do not
fall within the province of the present inquiry. However,
whatever the approach to and purpose of any study of pub-
lic works, it must necessarily be founded upon an under-
standing of the concrete details of the actual situation.
Therefore the scope, volume, distribution and fluctuation
of public works in the United States during the decade and
a half following the close of the World War are discussed in
detail in this volume. The concluding chapters, in touching
upon some of the basic problems off theory and practice in
the control of public works as an agency of economic stabi-PUBLIC WORKS AND STABILIZATION 5
lization, afford the point of departure for more intensive alms the broad general problem
HISTORYOF PROPOSALS AND MEASURES
Recourse has lone: been had to the of orovid-
ing employment for the jobless on emergency relief projects.
To go no furtner back than the aepression oF 1855, the New
York immigration authorities sent all those applying for
help to work on the enlargement of the Erie Canal. During
the depression of 1857—58, at the suggestion of the Mayor
of New York that the unemployed be hired on public proj-
ects at a 'fair wage', some work was given on street clean-
ing and stone quarrying jobs. The long business depression
of the 'seventies prompted several cities to undertake similar
measures. Although ostensibly municipal enterprises, these
activities were, in many instances, managed by local charity
societies.' During the winter of 1914—15ninety-ninecities
were furnishing special work for relief purposes.2
Public works proposals have been distinguished from pure
relief work proposals, at least in theory, by the requirements
that only such works as are useful and not created solely for
the purpose of keeping men busy should be included, and
that only properly equipped persons are employed at the
rate of wages prevailing for the particular type of labor, not
at relief wages.
"This is an entirely different thing from the institution of
relief works the main purpose of which is to give work to unem-
ployed persons, and it involves more than merely deciding to
1BryceM. Stewart, Unemployment BenefitsintheUnited States,1930,
pp.53—4.
V. A. Mund, Prosperity Reserves of Public Works, Annals, American
Academy of Political and Social Science, May p. 5.6 PLANNING PUBLIC WORKS
put public works in hand after the crisis has already developed.
The object of such a policy is to provide a definite stimulus to
the economic system as a whole in periods of depression
and, by reserving public works for periods of depression, to avoid
heightening the preceding boom."
As earlyas1909 Professor A. L. Bowley explained that
planned public works differed from crude relief works in the
following respects: The work in question would be started
before unemployment became acute; there would be no artificial
demand for labor but only an adjustment in time of the ordi-
nary demand; the unemployed as a class would not be attracted,
for the demand would come from ordinary trade sources; the
wages paid would be measured only by the work done, being
contracted out on the ordinary commercial The distinc-
tion between the two ideas is important, for in practice there
has been much confusion of
In practice, however, chiefly because sufficient properly
planned works were not at hand, relief work of an unpro-
ductive and occasionally wasteful nature has often been re-
sorted to. Not until 1931 did the United States government
establish machinery designed to use public works as a pre-
ventive of unemployment (see below).
Abroad the possibility of using public works as a stabilizing
agency was recognized earlier. In 1902 the French government
Unemployment and Public Works (International Labour Office, 1931)p.2.
Minority Report of the (British) Poor Law Commission, 1909,PartII.
"Care mustbeused not to confuse emergency relief programs with the long
range planning of public works for employment stabilization, for the two
have practically nothing in common. The latter involves the physical and
fiscal planning of public construction projects over periods long enough to
cover complete business cycles, combined with such timing of the initiation
of projects that they will create employment when private business concerns
are curtailing payrolls. When these projects are undertaken they are to be
prosecuted in the usual way Such planning by its very nature cannot
be instituted after a period of cyclical unemployment is upon us. It must
extend over the 'prosperity' as well as the 'depression' phase of the cycle"
(Report on Public Works and Housing, State Emergency Relief Board of
Pennsylvania, January 1935, p. 3).PUBLIC WORKS AND STABILIZATION 7
officially endorsed the policy of reserving important public
works for periods of unemployment. In England the minority
report of the Poor Law Commission of 1909 suggested that the
government could "do a great deal to regularize the aggregate
demand for labour as between one year and another by a more
deliberate arrangement of its orders for work of a capital na-
ture". Many other European governments, Prussia, Sweden,
Norway and Finland, followed France in partially adopting or
in considering the policy of regulated public works, but none
attempted to apply it on a comprehensive scale. Examples of the
postponement of some construction for periods of slackened
business activity are found during the last fifteen years in many
countries—France, Italy, Norway, Sweden; conversely,
there are few countries which have not undertaken works earlier
than they would normally in order to afford unemployment
relief in bad times, especially during the post-War and the recent
slumps. Frequently, however, as in the case of the German 'pro-
ductive unemployment relief' schemes, these attempts have been
largely in the nature of pure relief works.°
STATE LEGISLATION
In the United States various states, New Jersey and Idaho
111 1915, Pennsylvania in 1917, Wisconsin in 1923, passed
legislation providing for public works as a remedy for un-
employment, but these measures either remained dead letters
or have had insignificant results.
The first two clearly envisaged public works merely as an
emergency relief device; in authorizing expenditures in times
of unemployment, they provided that only 'the needy' were to
be hired. The Idaho law was declared unconstitutional in 1916
because it made possible the appropriation of county as well
as state funds. The New Jersey law dealt with cases in which a
community had set up an unemployment relief committee. Under
it jobs might be given to unskilled laborers from the 'needy
Unenzploytnent and Public Works, pp. 128 if.8 PLANNiNG PUBLIC WORKS
of the locality at a wage rate fixed by the State Civil Serv-
ice Commission. The Pennsylvania law of 1917 was a distinct
advance in this respect. it created an emergency public works
fund of which the Governor, the Auditor General, the State
Treasurer and the Commissioner of Labor and Industry were
trustees. Upon receiving notice from the industrial board of the
Department of Labor and Industry that unemployment was
extraordinarily large, the Public Works Commission was au-
thorized to distribute the fund among government departments
for carrying out public projects, provided this were done with a
view to furnishing "the maximum of public employment in re-
lief of the existing condition of extraordinary unemployment,
consistent with the most useful, permanent and economic ex-
tension of the works aforesaid". The entire appropriation for
the emergency fund, however, amounted to only $4o,ooo; this
was spent during the depression of 1920—22, and no further ap-
propriations were made. Since the results of the measure were
so insignificant, the Pennsylvania legislature, when passing the
administrative code of 1923, provided for its repeal and the
abolition of the Public Works Commission.7
The California legislature passed a law in May 1.92 1provid-
ing that a Board of Control should secure plans of tentative
projects which could be suitably speeded during periods of
depression. When the Bureau of Labor notified the Governor
that a condition of "extraordinary unemployment" existed, the
Board of Control was to begin the distribution of an emergency
fund of $i,ooo,ooo for each biennial period, to be made avail-
able to provide for unforeseen contingencies for which there
were no appropriations in the budget. The law, however, never
became operative. In 1923 Wisconsin enacted a law similar to
The author of the law, Mr. Otto T. MaUery, commented as follows on its
repeal: "It was repealed as a part of the reorganization plan of the governor
in which as many commissions as possible were abolished and executive
authority simplified and centralized. There was no public attack on the
principle of the Emergency Public Works Commission, but as the author
of the Act, I had lost confidence in its efficacy. In the scramble for money
in the 'egislature there is a strong indisposition to lay aside funds [or the
future" (V. A. Mund, bc. cit., p. 6).PUBLIC WORKS AND STABILIZATION 9
the Pennsylvania measure, but nothing has come of it. The
Louisiana law of 1921merelyauthorized the release during de-
pressions of any public works already contemplated.8
The theory of planned public works was fully embodied
in the scheme proposed for Pennsylvania by the Governor's
Committee on Unemployment in 1931.°Thiscalled for a
board composed of representatives of the state government,
of some of the municipalities and counties, of the construc-
tion industry and of professional organizations of engineers
and architects. Under the direction of a full-time executive
officer the board was to prepare, for state and local authori-
ties, a six-year plan of projected public construction, the
plan to be revised at the end of every two years and pro-
jected for the ensuing six years.
Projects were subdivided into three groups: Group A was to
consist of work that had to be done immediately and for which
a definite time schedule was set; Group B of projects to be com-
pleted within the six-year period, but for which no definite time
limit was set; and Group C of work for which either funds could
not be made available within six years or the public demand
was not sufficiently pressing to warrant action in the near future.
Engineering and architectural plans were to be prepared in
advance and kept up to date. The reserve for periods of business
depression was to consist of projects covered by Group B, and,
in depressions of unusual severity, of some of the more impor-
tant projects of Group C. In order to avoid delay in setting the
plan in motion when desired, it was stipulated that the bond
8In1924theMassachusetts Assembly voted affirmatively on a resolution re-
quiring various departments of the state government to make "special fore-
casts for extension of public works specially adapted to supply increased
opportunities for employment of labor during periods of state wide indus-
trial depression". In New York a resolution was proposed in the Legislature
in 1921toestablish a legislative committee that would coordinate plans
for public work in the state, so as to secure the widest possible relief for
unemployment (Bryce M. Stewart, op.cit., p.57). Nothing appears to have
come of either plan.
Paul Douglas and Aaron Director, The l'roblcinof Unemployment,p. 2i8.io PLANNING PUBLIC WORKS
issues for the projects included in Group B should be authorized
in advance. To cope with cases where the total borrowing of the
communities approached the constitutional debt limits, it was
suggested as desirable to provide for flexible borrowing powers
or to permit the issue of additional bonds when the Board de-
clared that a state of emergency existed. Considerable control
over local works could be exercised by the Board by virtue of the
requirement that its approval must be obtained before local
authorities could exceed their normal constitutional debt limits.
Following the lead of the Federal government in estab-
lishing the Federal Employment Stabilization Board, three
public works bills were introduced in the Pennsylvania
legislature in 1933 providing for the long-range planning
of state and local public construction, with a view to its
cyclical control. Two passed the House and Senate but were
vetoed by the Governor. The third is still on the calendar
of the House.1°
PROPOSALS FOR FEDERAL LEGISLATION
The repeated efforts made since the World War to pass
Federal legislation for the advance planning and control of
public works proved fruitless till 1931. As early as January
1919 Senator Kenyon introduced a bill, carrying an appro-
priation of $ioo,ooo,ooo, to create a United States Emer-
gency Public Works Board, which would cooperate with
Federal, state .and municipal agencies in stimulating public
works in times of depression. After extensive hearings, how-
ever, the bill was reported unfavorably and abandoned. In
1923 the principle of planned public works received official
endorsement, from the President's Conference on Unem-
ployment.h1 Following its recommendations, Senator Ken-
For details see Report on Public Works and Housing (State Emergency
Relief Board of Pennsylvania), pp.
Business Cycles and Unemployment (National Bureau of Economic Re-
search, 1923),pp. 231—61.PUBLIC WORKS AND STABILIZATION 11
yonintroduced a bill "to prepare for future cyclical periods
of depression and unemployment by systems of public
which provided for
neering plans by the various departments of the Federal
government and gave broad powers to the President in re-
tarding or expediting projects. This bill was also dropped,
apparently mainly because the nature of planned public
works was at that time only imperfectly understood, and
also because a majority in the Senate did not wish to place
powers of acceleration wholly in the hands of the President.
Early in 1923 Mr. Hoover, then Secretary of Commerce,
requested in a letter to the President "that an executive or-
der be sent to all divisions of the government to have public
works slowed down until after therea relaxation in pri-
vate demands for labor in construction". "We can," he said,
"by this means contribute something to a more even flow of
employment not only directly in the construction work but
in the material trades." 12Itis asserted that in accordance
with this request no new Federal construction that could
be postponed was begun during 1923. In 1925 a bill was
introduced in the House which had as its object the incor-
poration of the principle of planned public works in the
public buildings program to aid employment stabilization.'3
In 1926 an amendment to the public buildings bill was in-
troduced in Congress providing that "the Secretary of the
Treasury shall take into consideration the stabilizing effect
governmental construction policy may exert upon general
employment and industrial activity, and shall report to Con-
gress with recommendations whenever the volume of con-
struction for the United States during any period falls
one-third below the volume of the corresponding period of
BryceM. Stewart, op. cit., pp. 57—8.
Unemploymentand Public Works, p.
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1925". This amendment was not adopted.14 In January
1928 Senator W. L. Jones introduced a bill "to create a
prosperity reserve and to stabilize industry and employ-
ment by the expansion of public works during periods of
industrial depression". An .appropria-
was proposed for the reserve fund.
to be started as soon as the volume of
as measured by its value, had during
20 per cent below the average of the
-month period of the years 1926 and
some modification, was reported favor-
but was not enacted into law.'5 A bill
Senator Wagner of New York in May 1928
the emergency construction of certain public
relief of unemployment during periods of
ssion" met with a similar fate.
During the 1929—30 session Senator Wagner introduced
another bill dealing with the same subject. It passed the
Senate in April 1930 and the House of Representatives, in a
much modified form, in July 1930, and eventually became
law in February 1931.
The act provided for the creation of a Federal Employ-
ment Stabilization Board composed of four cabinet mem-
bers—the Secretaries of the Treasury, of Commerce, of La-
bor and of Agriculture—with a permanent staff. Its function
was to watch the movement of business activity and report
to the President whenever a state of depression existed or
was likely to arise within the succeeding six months in the
United States or in any substantial part thereof. Upon re-
ceipt of such notice the President was to transmit it to
Congress with an estimate of the appropriation needed to
undertake public works in the area affected. The law also
14BryceM. Stewart, op. cIt., p. 58.
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provided that Federal departments should prepare plans for
construction projects for six years; the Director of the Bud-
get to the projects.the creation
of the Federal Employment Stabilization Board the theory
of planned public works was first put into large-scale opera-
tion. In 1933,ith the creation of the Public Works Ad-
ministration, and later the National Planning Board, the
scale and character of the whole problem were so changed
that arrangements were made for transferring certain of the
Stabilization Board's functions to various appropriate divi-
sions of the Public Works Administration. The Board itself
later became, by Executive Order, the Federal Employment
Stabilization Office, and was placed under the jurisdiction
of the Department of Commerce. Meanwhile, in July 1932,
Congress had appropriated $300,000,000 for Federal public
works, and had authorized loans from the Reconstruction
Finance Corporation up to the aggregate sum of $1,500,000,-
ooo to states, counties, cities, and in some instances private
corporations, for'self-liquidating' construction. Thus for
thefirsttime the United States was touseits credit
to aid local borrowing for public works.16 In May 1933,
under the provisions of the Industrial Recovery Act, the
President was empowered to make emergency expenditures,
mainly on public works, up to a total of $3,300,ooo,ooo, and
to that end the Federal Emergency Administration of Public
Works was established. These measures are discussed fully
below: inasmuch as they were primarily emergency recovery
measures designed to cope with the immediate situation they
call for no detailed comment at this point.
In England, through the agency of the Public Works Loans Board, local
borrowing had been possible sincei 887 and most of the funds for housing
and similar projects undertaken by the smaller municipalities had been sup-
plied by this means.14 PLANNINGPUBLIC WORKS
CHANGING ATTITUDES TOWARDS PUBLIC WORKS DURING
THE DEPRESSION
In tracing the changes that the concept of the proper
function of public works as a device for influencing business
activity in general has undergone during recent years of
depression, four phases may be distinguished. Prior to the
depression of 1930—33,asshown above, though emergency
public works had long been regarded primarily as a means
of affording relief to the unemployed, the idea was slowly
emerging that they might be utilized as a force to compen-
sate for and thus moderate business fluctuation. Such analy-
sis of the problem as had been undertaken, and the advo-
cacy of planned public works based upon it, usually posited
both contraction of construction programs in prosperity and
their enlargement during depression. What we may call the
first phase was evident following the recession of 1929 and
during the early stages of the depression. Expanded public
construction was regarded chiefly as a means of preventing a
decline in business (even though there had previously been
no deliberate retardation of its volume), upon the assump-
tion that acceleration was desirable as early as possible de-
spite the condition of capital overexpansion from which the
recession represented a reaction. It was not generally felt
that some process of liquidation was inevitable once such a
situation had developed. This outlook prompted the advo-
cacy of 'unplanned' reserves of public works, namely, their
prompt acceleration upon the occurrence of a recession
without corresponding retardation in good times. It also
explains the general conviction that business relapse could
be prevented by 'keeping purchasing power intact' through
the maintenance of wage rates at their prevailing level. The
belief that the reaction was unlikely to prove serious andPUBLIC WORKS AND STABILIZATION '5
that underlying business conditions remained sound was
widespread.
This sentiment, however, became less assured as concern
grew during 1930overboth the mounting volume of unem-
ployment and the mounting budget deficit. As the depres-
sion developed, the agitation for enlarged programs of pub-
lic works was increasingly motivated by the desire to have
work provided for the unemployed. On the whole, little at-
tention was paid by public works advocates in this second
phase to the repercussions which such expanded expendi-
tures were likely to produce upon other factors in the total
situation, budgetary, financial and monetary, and the indi-
rect effects they might have, through these influences, upon
private business activity in general. As yet little general re-
alization was manifested that the limits of expansion of gov-
ernmental expenditures are narrowly restricted by adher-
ence to the gold standard and that attempts to pass beyond
these limits constitute a threat to the gold base.
In its third phase the problem of public works became an
aspect of the problem of fiscal and monetary policy during
depression. While still laying much stress upon the desirable
direct effects of expanded public works programs in afford-
ing unemployment relief, the advocates, in and out of Con-
gress, of bond issues for public works running into the bil-
lions began to attach still greater importance to the indirect
effects of enlarged expenditures in reputedly stimulating
the capital goods industries and increasing consumer pur-
chasing power.17 Public works were regarded as a means o
17Animportant example was the bill introduced in January 1932bySenator
Robert La Follette,Declaring that localeffortsto meet unemployment
problems had failed, he advocated the flotation of a five and a half billion
dollar bond issue for public works expenditures, in order to arrest deflation,
put men to work, stimulate production and create markets by distributing
purchasing power (S. 2419,72ndCong., 1st Sess., "A bill to accelerate public
construction during the present emergency, to provide employment, to cre-
ate the Administration of Public Works, and to provide for the morei6 PLANNING PUBLIC WORKS
arresting and reversing the cumulative downward move-
ment of the processes of business decline and were urged as
a 'reflationary' measure by many who were aware of the
threat of such action to the monetary standard. It was mainly
for the same reason that others opposed this policy. The is-
sue was not sharply drawn till the autumn of 1931.Thede-
parture from gold of Great Britain and of the countries
which followed it, however, by producing an international
scramble for gold and a world-wide pressure upon price
levels, brought to light the mutually contradictory nature
of the two opposed courses between which, thus far, Amer-
ican opinion and policy had vacillated. Choice henceforth
clearly lay between an attempt to readjust prices upwards
through expanded expenditures at the cost of increasing
deficits and the risk of injury to the bond market, govern-
ment credit and the gold base, and efforts to effect down-
ward readjustment of the cost-price structure along tra-
ditional lines of governmental retrenchment and business
liquidation and reorganization, with all their attendant so-
cial-economic difficukies. In this controversy, though the real
issue was often unformulated, and indeed for some time not
clearly realized in its full implications, public works became
one of the storm centers. The crux of the problem lay in
the question whether the beneficial direct effects upon activ-
ity and employment of increased expenditures were likely
to be greater or less than the injurious indirect effects that
they were in danger of producing.
This choice between these alternatives was not decisively
made until March 1933. Meanwhile the limiting factor con-
ditioning policies of expanded construction lay in the neces-
sity for any country intent to continue on gold of subordi-
natingitsinternalfiscaland monetary courseto the
effective coordination and correlation of the public works activities of the
Government"). The bill was frankly 'reflationary'.PUBLIC WORKS AND STABILIZATION '7
movement of the world gold price level, on pain of experi-
encing foreign drains of liquid funds and a flight of domestic
capitaLFacedwith this choice the UnitedStatesgovernment
cannotbesaidto have adopted a thoroughgoing and con-
sistent policyof 'deflation', for with the creation of the Re-
construction Finance Corporation it accorded financial sup-
port on a vastscale totheweakerbusinessand financial
institutions of the country. All proposals for greatly ex-
panded expenditures on public works, and especially the
use of Federal credit for the purpose, were, however, hence-
forward unequivocally opposed. This was demonstrated
anew as late as July 1932bythe nature of the measure
adopted in response to agitation which had been growing
more widespread and intense. The chief provision of that
measure, the Emergency Relief and Construction Act, men-
tioned above, was for the extension of loans to local subdi-
visions not by the Federal government, but by the RFC, on
the stipulation, moreover, that these loans should be granted
only for 'self-liquidating' or revenue-producing projects. As
a result of this requirement, and. of the high interest rates
charged, authorizations were made only very slowly, and
disbursements naturally more slowly still.
After the present Administration took office the indica-
tions are that at first it hoped to be able to embark on a
program of greatly increased expenditures (for public works
and other purposes) within the framework of the limits set
by adherence to the gold base and the traditional fiscal and
monetary policiesitrequired, but speedily came to the
conclusion that a choice between incompatible ends had
to be made and that a budget in reality if not ostensibly
unbalanced, and if necessary a departure from gold, were
the price that had to be paid in pursuit of an expansionist
policy. The passage of the National Industrial Recovery
Act, with its provisions for emergency construction and18 PLANNING PUBLIC WORKS
allied expenditures of over three billion dollars, and the
creation of a Federal Emergency Administration of Public
Works, was a decisive choice of policy. Huge funds were made
available for the speediest possible expenditure on pUblic
works; they were to be raised by Federal borrowing and were
to be used for local as well as Federal construction; the Fed-
eral government was to provide the funds in the form partly
of loans, partly of outright grants; and no requirement was
laid down that projects should be 'self-liquidating', in the
sense of revenu.e-producing.
During this, the fourth phase, public works were regarded
largely as a means of attaining the ends of fiscal policy. It was
realized that even though a policy of reflation had been de-
cided upon, and gold abandoned, measures that would actu-
ally increase the volume of consumer purchasing power and,
more important, the demand for producers' goods, were
needed to implement that policy. During this phase the diffi-
culty of 'rapidly spending, without waste and graft in the
absence of advance planning, the huge sums available for
the acceleration of public works became a dominant factor
in the situation. The wheel of opinion comes full circle with
the realization that if public works are to be really effective
as an agency of economic stabilization, comprehensive meas-
.ures are required which look towards their utilization, not
merely as a remedy when depressions occur, but in part for
the prevention of the causes of depression.18
18Thepurpose of this section, in tracing objectively the evolution of thought
on the subject, without critical evaluation, has been merely to show the ideas
from which certain courses of action sprang. They receive detailed examina-
tion in subsequent chapters, especially Ch. XIV.
This study covers the experience with the first great emergency public
works program, mentioned above. A second huge 'works relief' program,
carrying an additional appropriation of $4,000,000,000, of which the greater
part is allocated for public works, has just been approved by Congress
(April 5, 1935) and the details announced by the President(see Ch. V).